„Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo­ Wschodniej”, t. XLI

Streszczenia angielskie

Zbigniew Klejn

The Situation of the Bulgars under Ottoman Rule. An Attempt at Toppling Myths and Stereotypes

In his presentation of the situation of the Bulgarian population under Ottoman rule the author became involved in a polemic with conventional black­ and­ white schemes cultivated in world and Bulgarian historiography. Such schemes portray, on the one hand, the despicable cruelty of the Turkish oppressors and, on the other hand, the pitiful plight of the Bulgars, maltreated and denationalised by a policy which supposedly reduced the size of the population. Unmasking a number of myths well­ grounded in historical literature and social opinion, Z. Klejn concentrated on listing the concrete benefits which the Bulgarian population enjoyed in the discussed epoch in the form of an improved economic standard, education and culture. The usually reviled depiction of the situation of the Bulgarians within the Ottoman empire is contrasted with endurable and frequently opportune material and spiritual conditions. Moreover, the author has underlined the fact that the Bulgarian population profited from assorted political liberties. All these factors, he claims, guaranteed a stable economic situation and were conducive for stirring Bulgarian national awareness and pro­ independence aspirations.

In conclusion, the author proposes the thesis (not quite isolated in scientific literature) that Bulgaria under Turkish rule was actually one of the best developing provinces of the Ottoman empire. Furthermore, he maintains that a suitable exploitation of the wide range of political and socioeconomic autonomy enabled the Bulgars to create the foundation of an independent state. This objective could be realised only after toppling Turkish rule during the 1878–1908 period. Contrary to the thesis about the “dark ages” in Bulgarian history (fourteenth–nineteenth century) the Bulgars were actually capable of preserving an awareness of their national and linguistic distinctness.

Jarosław Rubacha

The Origin of the Balkan Alliance 1912

The conception of an alliance of the Balkan states, which was to constitute a foundation of permanent co­ operation and which dated back to the mid­ nineteenth century, remained unrealised until 1912. The main obstacles included national interests, which frequently antagonised the countries involved, and the ingenious policy conducted by the European powers, which consistently shattered all attempts at an arrangement that could prove detrimental to their interests. For a long time, the so­ called Macedonian question made it impossible for the Balkan states to reach a suitable agreement.

An atmosphere conducive for the establishment of an all­ Balkan union was created by the Bosnian crisis. The step taken against the status quo by Austro­ Hungary — up to then one of the prime pillars of the so­ called Berlin order — made Balkan politicians aware of the possibility of territorial changes on the Peninsula. This was one of the reasons for the establishment of the Balkan Bloc in 1912.

It must be additionally emphasised that although the Balkan alliance of 1912 should be regarded as an unmistakable diplomatic success, its members did not manage to avoid errors well known from the past. The most important impediment was the limited opportunity for creating a chain of bilateral conventions. Already in 1912 the signatories squandered chances for longer co­ operation by resigning from an all­ Balkan agreement that would delineate the range of the activity of the particular members and the sphere of their impact.

Krzysztof Buchowski

Union for the Liberation of Vilnius and the Vilno Myth in Inter­ war Lithuania

The Union for the Liberation of Vilnius was founded in the Republic of Lithuania in 1925 to sustain the idea of regaining Vilno, which since 1920 remained in Polish hands. According to universally held convictions, the town was “occupied” by Poland. For more than ten years the work conducted by the Union exerted an immense impact on the origin of the Vilnius myth in Lithuanian society, to be recognised as one of the most important factors decisive for shaping modern Lithuanian national identity. The leaders of all levels of the Union acted for purely ideological motives. Union activity was addressed primarily to young people, presented with a carefully devised and highly emotional vision of an “occupied Lithuania” and Polish­ Lithuanian relations. Suitably selected forms of impact produced a firmly enrooted, simplified, and stereotype perception of the complicated question of Vilno. An essential part was played by a campaign intent on stimulating sociopolitical life and borrowing its measures from American tradition, such as meetings immersed in an aura of emotional symbols, publications, souvenirs, and the application of elements of popular culture. The myth created during the inter­ war period, and portraying “occupied Lithuania”, produced a number of consequences which up to this very day are discernible in the views endorsed by Lithuanian public opinion and even scientific studies.

Wojciech Mazur

A High Risk Client. The Export of Polish War Materiel to Bulgaria during the Inter­ war Period

Upon the basis of the treaty signed at Neuilly after the first world war, Bulgaria was forced to drastically reduce her armed forces and to limit the outfitting of her military detachments. The enacted resolutions were to be protected by the powers of the victorious coalition and those neighbouring countries which obtained considerable territories at the cost of Bulgaria. The latter included Rumania — an ally of the Republic of Poland — which aimed at consolidating its authority in Southern Dobruja, to which Bulgaria also expressed claims.

The aforementioned factors became the reason why Polish exporters of military materiel initially bypassed Bulgaria in their activity pursued in the Balkans from the mid­ 1920s on. Gradually, they resigned from their stand, hoping for future profits from export transactions, and arguing that the treaty of Neuilly had never been ratified by Poland and that the restraints contained therein did not pertain to certain categories of armaments. The first contracts were signed with Sofia in 1932.

The range of the transactions was gradually expanded so as to include successive categories of materiel despite the resentful attitude of the Rumanian ally. In 1936 Poland found herself part of a small group of states providing Bulgaria with battle aircraft and suitable equipment and armament. It was precisely aircraft equipment which was to become the most valuable part of Polish supplies for the Bulgarian army.

Up to the outbreak of the second world war, Polish producers outfitted Bulgaria with materiel worth more than 23 million zlotys, making it possible to consider Bulgaria the third or fourth largest recipient of such equipment during the inter­ war period. In 1935–1938 materiel comprised, on an average, 41,2 % of Polish export to Bulgaria. The arms traffic was continued to the last peacetime days: consecutive large­ scale transactions were being negotiated in August 1939.

Piotr Łossowski

The Annexation of Memel by the Third Reich, 20–23 March 1939

This detailed presentation of the annexation of Memel by the Third Reich (March 1939) underlines the fact that the Nazi campaign constituted an important act of aggression, to be included among a number of similar German ventures, and a noteworthy element in the general preparations for war made by the Third Reich.

The author described the various undertakings conceived by German diplomacy, its ruthless and brutal methods, and various endeavours to obliterate the true nature of the Memel policy.

Faced with an ultimatum, the Lithuanian side found itself in an extremely difficult situation, with no one offering support or assistance. Unable to tackle the threat of military aggression, Lithuania was compelled to succumb to force. The article describes the seizure of Memel by the Reich and the role played by the local pro­ Nazi German community. The author also wrote about the echoes of the loss of Memel and its consequences for Lithuania.

The article is based on Lithuanian and Polish archival sources and German published documents. The cited literature includes most recent Lithuanian publications.

Jędrzej Paszkiewicz

The Italian Policy towards Croatian Territory in 1941–1943

The objective of the Italian policy relating to former Croatian Banovina in 1941–1943 was to achieve three basic targets : to guarantee supplies for the Italian war industry, to retain the availability of communication routes used for transporting material of strategic importance for the Italian economy, and to pacify the resistance of the local population. In none of those domains did the Italian wartime administration achieve satisfactory effects.

Control over Croatian territory was to confirm Italian impact throughout the whole of South­ Eastern Europe, which Rome regarded as her agricultural­ raw material hinterland. This region, delineated in the course of talks held with Germany after the fall of Yugoslavia in 1941, was composed of three parts. The first sphere of influence was a stretch of the Adriatic coast with the most important ports, annexed by Italy. The second encompassed terrains along the Adriatic belonging to the so­ called Independent State of Croatia (ISC), but under Italian occupation. Italian troops stationed also in the third zone, which encompassed the ISC from the eastern frontier of the second zone to the region of German impact. Italian policy in the conquered territories was based on plunder. Everything which could be useful for the development of the war machine — from raw material to a free­ of­ charge work force — was expropriated. Compulsory Italianisation and terror were supposed to win the obedience of the local Slavs. Despite enormous military efforts and co­ operation with her allies, Italy proved incapable of dispersing the anti­ fascist partisan movement. An end to the Italian political and economic plans was put by Germany, which in the middle of 1942 took over control over the whole Croatian puppet state. At the turn of 1942, the Italians could no longer control either the third or the second zone. Only the first annexed zone remained a mainstay of their impact. The weakness of the Italian economy, the uncertain situation on the front, and the organised resistance of the Slavonic population became the reasons why Italy was no longer capable of conducting a long­ term policy which in the future would generate closer economic ties in the region under its control.

Elżbieta Znamierowska­ Rakk

The Origin of the Idea of a Bulgarian­ Yugoslav Federation and Its Decline (1945–1948)

The article begins with a synthetic assessment of the origin of the idea of a Bulgarian­ Yugoslav federation, to be realised after the end of World War II. The author placed emphasis on the Macedonian question in view of the fact that one of the most prominent objectives of establishing a joint south Slavonic state was to resolve the persistent controversy between the Bulgars and the Yugoslavs. The article also discusses the supreme role of the Soviet Union in preparations for a south Slavonic union, drawing attention to the unequal political position of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, particularly conspicuous in negotiations held by the representatives of those states, who in 1944–1947 talked about setting up the titular federation and a mutual alliance. On the one hand, the article underlines external and domestic factors conducive (already during the war) for the establishment of a Yugoslav federation under the aegis of the local communist party, as well as the international acclaim of Josip Broz Tito and his prestige at home. On the other hand, the author stressed the difficult situation of Bulgaria on the international arena, caused by the fact that during the war Bulgaria was an ally of the Third Reich, with which the anti­ Nazi coalition had not yet signed a peace treaty. The article ends by arguing that despite the differences between the two south Slavonic states directly interested in unification, the primary cause of the failure of the conception of the Bulgarian­ Yugoslav federation was the collision of the political interests pursued by Belgrade and Moscow.

Translated by Aleksandra Rodzińska-Chojnowska